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The participation of health care organizations in partnerships and
joint ventures is an area of continuing growth and interest. Current
economic and social conditions, as well as the issuance of IRS guid-
ance in several key areas has presented nonprofit health care organiza-
tions with significant opportunities to further their charitable purposes
and fulfill their charitable goals through careful and selective partici-
pation in joint ventures with for-profit entities.
Since the Internal Revenue Service's reversal of its per se prohibi-
tion of an exempt organization entering into a partnership, tax-exempt
health care institutions have been able to take advantage of joint ven-
tures with for-profit partners in various ways, including whole hospi-
tal joint ventures with for-profit hospital systems and ancillary ar-
rangements involving ambulatory surgical centers, MRI, and other
medical specialties. Following the Plumstead decision,' nonprofit
hospital ancillary joint ventures more than doubled in the 1980s from
t Michael I. Sanders, Esq., is head of the tax practice at the law firm of
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, L.L.P. in Washington, D.C., and is the author of
PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT VENTURES INVOLvING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (1994).
Significant portions of this article are excerpted from PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT
VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (1st ed. 1994); the 1997 Sup-
plement to the 1st edition; JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
(2d ed. 2000); and the 2004 Supplement to the 2nd edition. Portions of this article
previously appeared in Ancillary Joint Ventures: The Impact of Rev. Rul. 2004-51 on
Ancillary Joint Ventures, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS (Nov.-Dec. 2004). Nancy Ortmeyer
Kuhn, Esq., and Susan A. Cobb, Esq., made a significant contribution, including the
creative analysis of Revenue Ruling 2004-51. Casey Lothamer has provided research
into the health care industry and its use ofjoint ventures.
1 Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982)
affig 74 T.C. 1324 (1980) (holding that a joint venture between a not-for-profit thea-
tre company and a for-profit limited partnership did not destroy the theatre company's
tax-exempt status).
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approximately 200 to approximately 450.2 In 2004, research data on
ancillary joint ventures conservatively estimates the number to be well
over 1,000 including joint ventures with physician organizations.3 It
is impossible to measure the effect the restrictive tax laws have had on
whole hospital joint ventures, but scholars estimate that there are 50 to
100 whole hospital joint ventures currently in operation.4
The explosive growth of nonprofit health care joint ventures with
for-profits results from competition in the health care industry,5
largely due to the increased presence of for-profit hospital systems.6
Since for-profit hospitals are subject to fewer restrictions, they are
better able to generate revenue, reduce excess capacity, streamline
operations, and turn away patients without insurance. Consequently,
they are able to realize increased profits and acquire improved tech-
nology, which leads to a competitive advantage over nonprofit hospi-
tals. This economic advantage has resulted in substantially less reve-
nue for nonprofits and has led to increased acquisitions of devalued
nonprofit hospitals by for-profit entities such as HCA,7 OrNda, and
Tenet.8 Some observers believe it is inevitable that virtually all health
care organizations will be forced to affiliate with a larger health care
system in order to survive.
9
2 Gary J. Young, Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements for Joint Ventures
Between Nonprofit Hospital Providers and For-Profit Entities: Form over Sub-
stance?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 327, 338 (2004) (citing LESLIE G. ARONOVITZ, U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-93-124, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS:
FOR-PROFIT VENTURES POSE ACCESS AND CAPACITY PROBLEMS 4 (1993), available at
http://www.gao.gov).
' Id at 339.
4 Id. at 338.
5 Between 1990 and 2000, 296 urban hospitals closed. The Department of
Health and Human Services sighted cited competition as the number one factor for
these hospital closings. See, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., TRENDS IN URBAN HOSPITAL
CLOSURE: 1990-2000, Pub. No. OEI 04-02-00611, (2003), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-02-0061 l.pdf.
6 See Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a
Competitive Market Environment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383, 423 (2004).
7 One of the biggest players in the consolidation arena is Hospital Corpora-
tion of America (HCA). Once a modest eleven-hospital system, HCA has grown to
be the nation's leading provider of health care with 191 hospitals and eighty-two
outpatient facilities. See HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, HCA COMPANY
HISTORY (2003), available at http://www.hcahealthcare.com/CPM/
CurrentCompanyHistoryl .pdf.
8 MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAx-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 328-29 (2d ed. 2000). In 1996, Tenet became the second-largest
network in the United States when it acquired OrNda. Tenet to Acquire OrNda in
$3.3 Billion Stock and Debt Deal, CNN MONEY, Oct. 17, 1996 at
http://money.cnn.com/1996/10/17/deals/tenet/.
9 See, e.g., Karen Pallarito, Hospital Conversions Raise Thorny Issues,
[Vol. 15:83
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The decline in reimbursement rates for inpatient health care ser-
vices is another important factor contributing to the increase in hospi-
tal joint ventures.'0 The dominance of managed care organizations,
such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred pro-
vider organizations (PPOs) has facilitated the process; these entities
provide such a large percentage of hospital income that they enjoy an
unfair negotiating position with health care providers and can pressure
hospitals for discounts that cut into profit margins.' Further adding
to the decline in reimbursement rates is legislation enacted by Con-
gress in 1997 to reduce Medicare payments for inpatient care.
12
While Congress has reversed some of these cuts, 13 the lack of inpa-
tient Medicare reimbursements continues to present a significant chal-
lenge to nonprofit organizations to be able to meet expenses and pro-
vide a health care benefit to the community."
4
Due to market pressures and reduced reimbursements for services
provided, nonprofit health care institutions have had to adopt a more
aggressive business strategy. 15 In doing so, nonprofits have formed
whole hospital joint ventures and ancillary joint ventures with physi-
cians, other nonprofits, and for-profit organizations. Ancillary joint
ventures are being utilized because they allow exempt health care
institutions to raise capital, bring new services or medical facilities to
needy areas, and attract physicians with diverse areas of medical ex-
pertise. 16 Additionally, nonprofits can gain patient referrals and en-
sure that their physicians do not establish competing health care pro-
viders by establishing ancillary or whole hospital joint ventures with
those same physicians.17
During the 1980s and 1990s, nonprofits were forming both ancil-
lary and whole hospital joint ventures in order to stay competitive in
the marketplace. However, as discussed above, the Service provided
relatively little guidance and consequently these joint ventures were
jeopardizing the exempt organization's status. Fortunately for non-
MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 17, 1996, at 104 (citing comments of California Assembly-
man Philip Isenbert).
1°See Young, supra note 2, at 339-40.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 340; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4401-54,
111 Stat. 251 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 301-15, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000);
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 112, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
14 See generally SANDERS, supra note 8, at 5 n.4.
15 Karns, supra note 6, at 506.




profits, the IRS recognized their competitive disadvantage in 1998 and
acted to provide guidance to nonprofits to allow them to move for-
ward and enter into joint ventures that would not threaten their tax-
exempt status by releasing Revenue Ruling 98-15.Is By analyzing
two hypothetical situations (one good and one bad) the IRS gave non-
profits some tools to use to form joint ventures and thereby remain
more competitive, reduce capacity, streamline operations, and lower
operating expenses. The IRS, however, addressed only whole hospital
joint ventures in Revenue Ruling 98-15. This left nonprofits with
little guidance to assist them in structuring ancillary joint ventures.
Nevertheless, nonprofits have been entering into some common trans-
actions without risking their tax-exempt status. 19
In the course of its participation in a partnership or joint venture
with one or more for-profit entities, the health care exempt organiza-
tion may take the role of a general partner or managing member, if
certain strict organizational and operational requirements are met.2°
Alternatively, the exempt organization may participate through a sin-
gle member LLC (which may be disregarded), a subsidiary, an affili-
ated organization, or as a limited partner. Generally, an exempt or-
ganization may invest as a limited partner (or a non-managing, non-
participatory member in the case of an LLC) in any prudent invest-
ment.2 1 Note that as a limited partner or non-managing member, the
18 See MARY JO SALINS, JUDY KINDELL, & MARVIN FRIEDLANDER, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL Topics: WHOLE HOSPITAL
JOrNT VENTURES, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irss-utl/tropica.pdf (explaining that the
IRS released Revenue Ruling 98-15 to provide guidance on tax consequences in joint
venture arrangements); Eileen M. Newell, Healthcare Joint Ventures.- Pushing Tax-
Exempt Law to the Limits?, 18 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 467, 484 (2002)
(stating that Revenue Ruling 98-15 provides more information about the IRS's posi-
tion on the future of tax exemption in the health care arena). Revenue Ruling 98-15 is
discussed more fully in Section II above.
19 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-037 (Aug. 14, 1992) (explaining that a non-
profit's joint venture did not risk exempt status, but that forming a joint venture with
members of a medical staff and selling the revenues derived from the entity's opera-
tions would jeopardize the entity's exempt status); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (Nov. 7,
1987) (a hospital's exempt status was not affected by its participation in joint venture
with non-exempt entities); Rev. Rul. 69-464, 1969-2 C.B. 132.
20 See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1982), aff'g 74 T.C. 1324 (1980); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983) (con-
cluding an exempt organization may qualify under § 501(c)(3) notwithstanding its
participation in a limited partnership as one of several general partners if the partner-
ship arrangement permits the exempt organization to act exclusively in furtherance of
the purposes for which exemption may be granted).
21 The recently issued IRS 2003-2004 Priority Guidance Plan lists guidance
on (1) joint ventures between exempt organizations and for-profits; and (2) low in-
come housing partnerships and § 501(c)(3) participation as priority subjects. News
Release JS-600, Internal Revenue Service (July 24, 2003), available at
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exempt organization may be subject to UBIT22 on any joint venture
activity unrelated to the exempt organization's charitable purposes.
This article will concern itself primarily with the conditions under
which an exempt organization may take on the more formidable role
of general partner of a limited partnership or managing member of a
limited liability company. After summarizing the history and analysis
of joint ventures between tax-exempt and for-profit organizations,
generally, it will focus on hot issues in this area, including the follow-
ing:
* Revenue Ruling 2004-51, recently issued by the Treas-
ury Department, Internal Revenue Service.
* The St. David's case, in which a jury in U.S. District
Court decided in favor of the hospital system after appli-
cation of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning.
After an appeal of the jury verdict, the parties have set-
tled all outstanding issues.
23
* The Redlands Surgical Services Tax Court case, affirmed
on appeal by the 9th Circuit.
24
" Revenue Ruling 98-15, which focuses on whole hospital
joint ventures, but also provides guidance applicable to
all joint ventures and partnerships involving charitable
organizations.25
* The intense scrutiny by the IRS with regard to whether
the tax-exempt organization has "control" over the part-
nership or joint venture.
* The impact of § 4958 and the intermediate sanctions ex-
cise taxes.
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/JS600.htm.
22 Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) is a tax imposed on a tax-exempt
organization's net income from regularly carried on trade or business not substantially
related to the organization's exempt purpose.
23 Federal Jury Affirms St. David's Exempt Status, AM. HEALTH L. ASW'N
NEws & ANALYSIS, Mar. 9, 2004 at http://www.healthlawyers.org/ofnotes/2004/
ofhotestdavid_040309.cfin (reporting that a district court jury affirmed the tax-
exempt status of a non-profit health care system after the Fifth Circuit remanded the
case for trial).
24 Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff'd, 242
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
25 Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6.
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II. HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF JOINT VENTURES
BETWEEN TAX-EXEMPT AND FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
A. The Early Days: Per Se Prohibition
Prior to Plumstead Theatre Society, an exempt organization auto-
matically ceased to qualify as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3) when it
served as a general partner in a partnership that included private in-
vestors as limited partners, or otherwise shared net profits.26 The IRS
reasoning behind this position was threefold:
1. The limited partnership vehicle served as a means
to share profits with private individuals;
2. By agreeing to serve as a general partner, the
exempt organization was under a fiduciary duty to
further the private financial interests of the limited
partners; and
3. As a general partner the exempt organization
incurred unlimited liability for the debts of the
partnership, and thus exposed charitable assets for
the purpose of relieving the private investors from
liability.2
7
The IRS deemed all of the above as being incompatible with op-
erating "exclusively" for charitable purposes.28
B. Plumstead Theatre Society and the Two-Prong Test
The IRS's "per se" opposition to exempt organizations' involve-
ment in joint ventures with for-profit investors was abandoned in
1982, with the issuance of the Plumstead Theatre Society decision. In
Plumstead, a theatre company organized to promote and foster the
performing arts entered into a limited partnership with three for-profit
investors to raise revenue needed to produce a stage play.29 The IRS
denied tax-exempt status to Plumstead on the grounds that it was not
operated exclusively for charitable purposes.3°
However, the Tax Court, and later the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, disagreed, holding that Plumstead was operated exclusively for
26 See Gen. Couns. Mere. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
27 id.
28 Id. (explaining that 501(c)(3) applies to organizations operated for exclu-
sively charitable purposes).
29 Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1328.
30 Id.
[Vol. 15:83
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charitable (and educational) purposes, and therefore was entitled to
exemption. 3' The court based its holding on the safeguards contained
in the limited partnership agreement, which served to insulate Plum-
stead from potential conflicts with its exempt purposes. 32 These safe-
guards included the following:
1. The transaction was conducted at arm's length, and
at a reasonable price;
2. The exempt organization had no obligation to
return the limited partners' capital contributions;
3. The limited partners had little or no control over
the affairs of the partnership;
4. There was no profit motive exhibited by the exempt
organization;
5. None of the limited partners, or any officer or
director of a limited partner, was an officer or
director of the exempt organization.
33
The IRS now utilizes a two-prong "close scrutiny" test (based on
Plumstead, Housing Pioneers Inc. v. Commissioner,34 and G.C.M.
39,005) to determine the permissibility of joint venture arrangements
between exempt and for-profit entities. The two-prong test requires
(i) that the activities of the partnership further charitable purposes; and
(ii) that the structure of the partnership insulates the exempt organiza-
tion from potential conflicts between its charitable purposes and its
general partnership obligations, and minimizes the likelihood that the
arrangement will generate private benefit.
1. First Prong: Charitable Purpose
a. Introduction
Where an exempt organization seeks to conduct activities through
a partnership as general partner, or as a managing member in the case
of an LLC, the IRS will scrutinize the arrangement to ensure that the
joint venture is operating in furtherance of the exempt organization's
31 Id. at 1334, aff'd, 675 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1982).
32 Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1333.
31 Id. at 1333-34.
34 65 T.C.M. 2191 (1993), aff'd, 49 F.3d 1395 (9th Cir. 1995), amended by
58 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1995). The two standards were applied in Housing Pioneers to
deny a housing organization's 501(c)(3) exemption. Through the organization's
involvement as a co-general partner in limited partnerships, the partnerships took
advantage of reduced property taxes and low-income housing tax credits. The Tax
Court held that the organization furthered non-exempt purposes and served private
interests. Housing Pioneers Inc., 65 T.C.M. at 2196.
2005]
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charitable purposes. Generally, charitable purposes include activities
that relieve the poor and distressed or underprivileged; advance relig-
ion, education or science; erect or maintain public buildings, monu-
ments or works; and lessen the burdens of government.
35
2. Second Prong: Structure of the Limited Partnership Insulates the
Exempt Organization
Even if a charitable purpose or purposes are definitively estab-
lished by the exempt organization participating in the joint venture,
conflict between charitable goals and private interests may arise based
on the state statutory obligations of the general partner to the limited
partners, or through covenants or provisions contained within the op-
erating agreement or other governing instrument. Among these obli-
gations are an assumption of unlimited liability by the general partner
for the partnership's debts, an obligation to further the profit interests
of the other limited partners or members, and any obligations assumed
under certain guarantee or capital call provisions drafted in favor of
the private investors.
Essentially, the partnership or joint venture must be structured in
such a way as to (i) protect the exempt organization's assets from ex-
posure to unnecessary risk for the benefit of the for-profit partners;
and (ii) minimize the potential for private inurement. In its analysis of
whether an arrangement adequately shelters the assets of the exempt
organization, and resolves, to the greatest degree possible, the statu-
tory obligations of the general partners to the limited partners, certain
factors will bear favorably upon the IRS's determination:
* Limited contractual liability of the exempt partner.
* Limited rate of return to the limited (for-profit) partners.
* Exempt organization's right of first refusal on the sale of
the partnership assets.
• Lack of control over the partnership by limited partners
(e.g., parties are "unrelated" and no limited partner
serves as an officer or director of the exempt organiza-
tion).
* The presence of additional general partners obligated to
protect the interest of the limited partners.
35 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-(2) (2003). See also SANDERS, supra note 8, at
51-61 (providing further detail of "relief of the poor," "religion," "educational organi-
zations," and "scientific organization" activities included in the definition of charita-
ble).
[Vol. 15:83
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* No obligation on the part of the exempt organization to
return the limited partners' capital contribution from the
exempt organization's funds.
* Profit is not a primary motivation.
* All transactions with the limited partners are made at
arm's length and are reasonable.
* There is a lack of "negative" or unfavorable factors
and/or improper guarantees.
On the other hand, the presence of certain factors will bear unfa-
vorably upon the IRS's determination:
* A disproportionate allocation of profits, losses or tax
items in favor of the limited partners.
* Commercially unreasonable loans by the exempt organi-
zation to the partnership.
* Inadequate compensation paid to the exempt organization
for services rendered, or excessive compensation paid by
the exempt organization for services received.
" Control of the exempt organization (or the activities of the
partnership) by the limited (for-profit) partners.
* Abnormally low or insufficient capital contributions by
the limited partners, or provisions requiring dispropor-
tional capital contributions by the exempt organization.
* A profit motivation by the exempt partner.
* A lack of positive or favorable factors.
III. ISSUES AFFECTING § 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS
AND JOINT VENTURES
A. Revenue Ruling 98-1536
In 1998, the IRS released a long-awaited revenue ruling on whole
hospital joint ventures. Revenue Ruling 98-15 incorporates the two-
part test from Plumstead and Housing Pioneers that a joint venture
must further a charitable purpose and that the joint venture documents
must allow the exempt organization to continue furthering its exempt
purpose without benefiting the private parties more than inciden-
36 See generally SANDERS, supra note 8, at 135-39, 359-75 (discussing in




tally.37 Although Revenue Ruling 98-15 focuses on hospitals, it pro-
vides significant guidance for all joint ventures and partnerships in-
volving charitable organizations.38 In fact, IRS spokespersons have
indicated that they will apply this ruling outside the hospital joint ven-
ture context. 39 As discussed more fully below, the IRS focuses on
whether tax-exempt organizations "control" the ventures in which
they participate. The IRS reasons that if a tax-exempt organization
lacks fundamental control, it may also lack the ability to cause the
venture to carry out their exempt functions.
This rationale has been applied by the IRS in the recent cases St.
David's Health Care System,4 0 Redlands Surgical Services, and
United Cancer Council v. Commissioner.4 1 Consistent with the fore-
going analyses, Revenue Ruling 98-15 confirms that an exempt or-
ganization should possess control over a venture to ensure that the
arrangement does not jeopardize the charity's exempt status. In gen-
eral, an organization can enter safely into a venture or management
contract if it maintains final control over the assets it contributes, and
if the terms of the contract are reasonable.42 The IRS therefore does
not intend Revenue Ruling 98-15 to eliminate joint ventures between
exempt organizations and for-profit entities. 43 Rather, the ruling sim-
ply incorporates existing principles that, in a joint venture, maximiza-
tion of profits must not override charitable purposes and that the
whole community should benefit from the services provided by the
joint venture.44 The ruling illustrates the type of facts and circum-
stances that the IRS considers significant, by presenting two situa-
37 IRS Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education Text for FY
1999: Chapter A, Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, 98 TAx NOTES TODAY 156-15, Aug.
13, 1998, at 49 [hereinafter "CPE Text"] (detailing the IRS's application of the two-
prong analysis in reviewing joint ventures between tax-exempt and for-profit organi-
zations).
" See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 7-9.
39 See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Control Principle in Hospital Joint Venture
Ruling Could Apply Elsewhere, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 22, 1998 (citing Marcus
Owens, IRS Exempt Organizations Director).
40 St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6878
(W.D. Tex 2002), vacated by 349 F3d 232, 240 (5th Cir. 2003).
41 United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173, 1174-75
(7th Cir. 1999) (applying the rule in a situation where a private party seized control of
a charitable organization, therefore destroying its tax-exempt status). See Section III
B, below. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997) (allowing a low-income
housing partnership to receive tax-exempt status because those in charge of the chari-
table aspects of the housing program strengthened control over the operations of the
partnership).
42 See CPE Text, supra note 37, at 49.
" Id. at 61.
44 See id.
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tions, one good and one bad. Key factors include, inter alia, a long-
term management contract; composition of the Board and its fiduciary
duty, relative to charitable purpose; related officers including former
employees of the for-profit in "day to day" management of the ven-
ture.4 5 These situations are summarized below.
1. Example 1 (Good Example)
A § 501(c)(3) public charity (Charity 1), which operated a hospi-
tal, contributed the hospital and all of its operating assets to a limited
liability company (LLC 1) in exchange for an interest therein. A for-
profit corporation (For-Profit 1) that owned and operated several hos-
pitals also contributed assets to the LLC in exchange for an interest
therein. The interests in the LLC that Charity 1 and For-Profit 1 re-
ceived were in proportion to their contributions.
The LLC's Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement
(Governing Instruments) provided that its governing board was com-
posed of five individuals, three of whom Charity 1 selected, and two
of whom For-Profit 1 selected. Charity 1 intended to select commu-
nity leaders with hospital experience, but who were not on the con-
tributed hospital's staff and who did not otherwise engage in business
transactions with the hospital.
The Governing Instruments could only be amended with both
owners' approval. They also required a majority of three members to
approve certain major decisions, including the following:
" LLC l's annual capital and operating budgets
* Distributions of LLC I's earnings
" Selection of key executives
* Acquisition or disposition of health care facilities
" Contracts that exceeded a fixed dollar amount per year
* Changes to the types of services the hospital offered
* Renewal or termination of management agreements
The LLC's Governing Instruments required it to operate the hos-
pital in a manner that furthered charitable purposes by promoting
health for a broad section of its community. They specifically pro-
vided that the duty of its board to satisfy the community benefit stan-
dard overrode any fiduciary duty to operate LLC 1 for its owners'
financial benefit. They also provided that all returns of capital and all
distributions of income must be in proportion to the ownership inter-
ests in LLC.
45 See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 6-7.
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The parties to the transaction also executed a Management
Agreement (the "Agreement") with a management company that was
unrelated to either Charity 1 or For-Profit 1. The Agreement was for
five years, and was renewable for additional five-year periods by mu-
tual consent. It compensated the management company based on the
LLC's gross revenues, was comparable to other similar arrangements,
and could be terminated for cause.
None of the officers, directors, or key employees of Charity 1
who were involved in making the decision to form the LLC were
promised employment or any other inducement by the LLC or the
For-Profit and their related entities, or had any interest in the For-
Profit or any of its related entities. Charity I intended to use any dis-
tributions that it would receive from the LLC to promote health in the
community and to help indigents obtain health care. After forming
LLC 1, Charity 1 's grant-making activities and its participation in the
LLC constituted its sole activities.
2. Example 2 (Bad Example)
Example 2, like Example 1, involved a § 501(c)(3) exempt or-
ganization that operated a hospital (Charity 2), a for-profit corporation
that owned and operated hospitals (For-Profit 2), and an LLC which
they jointly formed (LLC 2). The facts of Example 2 were virtually
identical to those of Example 1, with the following relevant differ-
ences:
" Control In Example 2, the LLC's Governing Instruments
provided that it was to be managed by a governing board
consisting of three individuals chosen by Charity 2 and
three individuals chosen by For-Profit 2. In contrast, in
Example 1, the Charity clearly controlled the LLC.
* Purpose and Board's Fiduciary Duty. In Example 2, the
LLC's Governing Instruments lacked a provision compa-
rable to the one in LLC I's Governing Instruments, which
required the LLC to operate in a manner furthering chari-
table purposes by promoting health for a broad section of
its community and explicitly provided that the duty of its
board to satisfy the community benefit standard overrode
any fiduciary duty to operate LLC 1 for its owners' finan-
cial benefit.
* Management Contract. The management company in
Example 2 was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the For-
Profit, rather than an independent organization as in Ex-
ample 1. Moreover, its contract was renewable in perpe-
tuity at the management company's discretion, rather than
[Vol. 15:83
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being renewable by mutual consent. Finally, the Man-
agement Agreement was terminable only for cause, rather
than merely "terminable for cause" as in Example 1.
* Related Officers. "In Example 2, the parties agreed that
the LLC's CEO and CFO would be two individuals who
previously worked for the For-Profit in hospital manage-
ment, and that they would work with the management
company to oversee LLC 2's day-to-day operations.
There were no such related key employees in Example 1.
* Minimum Distributions. LLC 2's Governing Instru-
ments provided for a minimum level of required distribu-
tions, with majority approval of additional distributions
required. In Example 1, the Board, which the tax-exempt
organization controlled, was required to approve any dis-
tributions.
" Large Contracts. In Example 2, LLC 2's Governing In-
struments required majority approval of "unusually large"
contracts, rather than contracts over a specified dollar
amount as in Example 1.
3. IRS Analysis
In Example 1, the IRS ruled that Charity 1 would continue to
qualify as a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization because its participa-
tion in the LLC would further charitable purposes, and it would con-
tinue to be operated exclusively for such purposes. The IRS stated
that after the LLC's formation, Charity I's activities would consist of
the health care services it would provide through the LLC and any
grantmaking activities it could conduct using income distributed by
LLC 1.
The IRS also noted that Charity 1 could ensure that the benefit to
For-Profit 1 and other private parties, like the management company,
would be incidental to the accomplishment of charitable purposes
because LLC l's Governing Instruments committed it to providing
health care services for the benefit of the community as a whole and
to giving charitable purposes priority over maximizing profits for its
owners. It also noted that Charity 1 could minimize private benefit
through (a) its appointment of members of the community familiar
with the hospital to LLC l's board, (b) the board's structure, which
gave Charity l's appointees voting control, and (c) the specifically
enumerated powers of the board over changes in activities, disposition
of assets, and renewal of the management agreement.
The IRS also ruled that because Charity l's grantmaking activity
would be contingent upon its receiving distributions from LLC 1, its
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principal activity would continue to be the provision of hospital care.
Therefore, as long as this remained true, Charity 1 would not be clas-
sified as a private foundation.
In Example 2, the IRS ruled that Charity 2 would violate the re-
quirements of § 501(c)(3) when it formed and contributed all of its
assets to LLC 2 because unlike Charity 1, it would fail the operational
test, pursuant to which it must be operated exclusively for charitable
purposes. In support of its ruling, the IRS stated that absent a binding
obligation in the LLC's governing documents for LLC 2 to serve
charitable purposes or otherwise provide its services to the community
as a whole, the LLC would be able to deny care to segments of the
community, such as the indigent. Moreover, it noted that because it
would share control of the LLC with For-Profit 2, Charity 2 would be
unable to initiate programs within LLC 2 to serve new health needs
within the community without obtaining the agreement of at least one
of the governing board members that For-Profit 2 appointed. In this
regard, it noted that as a business enterprise, For-Profit 2 would not
necessarily give priority to the community's health needs over the
consequences for the LLC's profits.
The IRS also supported its ruling by stating that the primary
source of information for board members appointed by Charity 2
would be the chief executives, who had a prior relationship with For-
Profit 2 and the management company, a subsidiary of For-Profit 2.
Moreover, it noted, the management company itself would possess
broad discretion over LLC 2's activities and assets that may not al-
ways be under the board's supervision. To illustrate this, the IRS
noted that the management company was permitted to enter into all
but "unusually large" contracts without board approval, and that the
management company could also unilaterally renew the management
agreement.
4. Lessons For Joint Ventures Involving Tax-Exempt Organizations
First, as a preliminary note, Example 1 involved a number of facts
and circumstances that were entirely favorable and Example 2 in-
volved facts and circumstances that were entirely unfavorable. Some
of the factors may not be comparable to those found in the real world.
For example, the management contract in Example 2 allows the man-
agement company to continuously renew the contract in perpetuity,
while in practice, such a provision may be rare.
Second, because there were so many factors in both examples, it
is difficult to analyze how far an arrangement may differ from the
facts set forth in Example 1 without jeopardizing a charity's tax-
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exempt status. However, the IRS 2000 CPE contains an article on
health care joint ventures46 in which it comments on the various crite-
ria of Revenue Ruling 98-15. For example, the 2000 CPE joint ven-
ture article states that it is "important" that the terms of the governing
documents in Example 1, which require the LLC to be operated for a
charitable purpose, are "legal, binding and enforceable under applica-
ble state law.' '47 Also, the IRS 2002 CPE contains an article which
updates the IRS's interpretation of Revenue Ruling 98-15 in the health
care area, including a new checklist for joint venture arrangements. 48
The 2002 CPE Article discusses the factors in Situation 1 of Revenue
Ruling 98-15, and poses several scenarios in which the joint venture
"falls short of Situation 1." The IRS has indicated its willingness to
publish guidance covering certain gray areas.
The 2002 CPE Article states that if the for-profit manager man-
ages the venture, it "is not necessarily fatal" to the tax-exempt status
of the nonprofit hospital.49 This is a very harsh standard. The burden
of proof to overcome a factor that is not necessarily fatal to exemption
is very high. Some of the favorable factors that are discussed in the
article relate to the decisions connected to the provision of charity
care, by the joint venture.
The 2002 CPE Article specifies several times that such decisions
should be made by majority vote of a management committee con-
trolled by the charity. 50 The for-profit partner may not have veto
power over the critical decisions.5' In the context of the article, these
statements assume that the nonprofit hospital has a majority on the
board and the quorum.52 The CPE Article stresses that it is important
that the nonprofit controls all charity-care policy decisions and can
46 Mary Jo Salins & Marvin Friedlander, Update on Health Care Joint Ven-
ture Arrangements, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2000 17 (Tax Analysts ed.
2000) [hereinafter Salins, 2000 CPE Article].
47 Id.
48 Lawrence M. Brauer, Mary Jo Salins & Robert Fontenrose, Update on
Health Care, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2002, 155 (2002) at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/topicd02.pdf [hereinafter Brauer, 2002 CPE Article].
49 Id. at 160 (explaining when a for-profit partner could manage a joint ven-
ture that could still remain a tax-exempt organization under 501(c)(3)).
50 Id. at 160-61 (providing an example of an organization that would remain
exempt under 501(c)(3) that is controlled by a Partnership Management Committee
with a majority of members from the not-for-profit hospital).
51 See id. at 161.
52 Id. at 160-61.
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ensure that the charitable purposes prevail over the private for-profit
interests.53
Another outstanding issue relates to the fact that both of the situa-
tions described in the ruling involve whole hospital joint ventures. As
a result, some commentators believe that Revenue Ruling 98-15
should not apply to less than whole-hospital joint ventures.5 4 How-
ever, others assert that the IRS will apply its analysis to ancillary joint
ventures as well."
Despite its shortcomings, Revenue Ruling 98-15 provides signifi-
cant guidance for all partnerships and joint ventures involving tax-
exempt organizations. Revenue Ruling 98-15 indicates that control by
the exempt organization over the operational and organizational struc-
ture of a venture is crucial.5 6 To satisfy this requirement, the organ-
izational documents for ventures involving tax-exempt organizations
should contain legally enforceable provisions that vest the exempt
organizations with control over the venture.57 The IRS position on
this issue should give exempt organizations significant leverage when
negotiating joint venture structures with for-profit partners.
Historically, after a 50/50 joint venture was formed, the exempt
organization board members generally possessed only veto authority
over major operational decisions, and had little or no ability to influ-
ence staff working conditions, compensation or status.58 While the
exempt organization representatives in a 50/50 joint venture can tem-
porarily block actions proposed by the for-profit, they are essentially
powerless to force the joint venture to take affirmative actions that
they considered essential to meet charitable purposes. 59 For example,
the exempt organization may be able to block the appointment of a
joint venture CEO that it believes may be insensitive to charitable
51 See id. at 161.
54 Id. at 158.
55 Michael Peregrine & T.J. Sullivan, Rev. Rul. 98-15 Confirms Traditional
Tax Planning Approach for 'Typical' Joint Ventures, 98 TAx NoTEs TODAY 102-42,
May 28, 1998 at 2 ("Nevertheless, nothing in the ruling limits its scope to whole-
hospital joint ventures, and the Service can be expected to apply the analysis in the
ruling to all joint ventures."). These commentators point out that the factors de-
scribed in Revenue Ruling 98-15 are entirely consistent with the "close scrutiny" test
that came out of Plumstead, Housing Pioneers, and G.CM. 39,005, which applies to
all joint ventures between exempt organizations and for-profit entities, See id. at 13.
56 See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 9.
57 The law in some states may preclude such a requirement, in which case the
partnership or LLC would need to be organized in a different state.
58 Robert A. Boisture & Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Caplin & Drysdale Comments
on Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, 16 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 650, 655 (1997).
'9 Id. at 655-56.
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goals, but cannot compel the appointment of a CEO it affirmatively
supports.60
In Situation 2 of Revenue Ruling 98-15, it is apparent that the IRS
also believes that the power to block an action is, in itself, insufficient
to demonstrate and promote the exempt purpose.61 The 2000 CPE
joint venture article also emphasizes that "effective control" by the
nonprofit partner of the entire decision making process is essential.62
When answering the question of whether Example 2 could be re-
formed so that the LLC would not jeopardize the nonprofit partner's
exemption, the IRS states that changing one factor alone, such as re-
quiring the LLC to act for the benefit of the community, or to require
a set term for renewal of the management contract, would not neces-
sarily be sufficient. Thus, use of a veto as a viable device for preserv-
ing exempt organization control in the 50/50 joint venture is suspect,
even when coupled with other safeguards.
The control issue was also analyzed in the 2002 CPE Article, re-
garding specifically whether the nonprofit hospital must own the ma-
jority interest of the venture and control the governing board of the
joint venture in order to remain exempt under § 501 (c)(3). 63 The arti-
cle concludes that if the tax-exempt entity lacks the majority vote to
ensure it controls the major decisions (i.e., decisions relating to char-
ity care) then there must be "another mechanism" in place to ensure
that the joint venture will operate to further the exempt organization's
charitable purposes. 64 There is no indication in the article what
"mechanism" would be satisfactory, however the criteria in the
Checklist, as expanded and printed below, may be instructive.
Query: Would a supermajority vote or an arbitration provi-
sion which recognizes a presumption in favor of the nonprofit
in case of a deadlock be favorable in this context?
The 2002 CPE Article's authors note that the IRS has not recog-
nized exemption in any joint venture where the tax-exempt entity's
share of the control was lower than fifty percent, and only a few or-
ganizations have been recognized as exempt when the control over the
60 Id. at 656.
61 See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 9 (illustrating in Situation 2 that the
board members will not be engaging in activities that further an exempt purpose, and
the management company may not always be under the board's supervision).
6 Salins, 2000 CPE Article, supra note 46, at 38.









Set forth below are several factors that can be used as guidance in
making a determination as to whether a joint venture arrangement
allows a nonprofit to operate exclusively for charitable purposes.
These questions were developed based upon a review of recent court
opinions and IRS administrative materials on joint ventures, including
the IRS EO Technical Topics on Whole Hospital Joint Ventures.67
While these factors are not exhaustive, they can serve as a starting
point for practitioners structuring joint venture arrangements.
In General.-
1. Does the participation of the exempt organization in the
joint venture further its exempt purposes? The IRS will
deny or revoke exemption of an organization that enters
into a joint venture where the primary motive is to make a
profit.
2. Are the assets of the exempt partner adequately protected?
The exempt organization can avoid a negative conclusion
by ensuring that:
(i) It has taken steps to limit its contractual liability in the
joint venture;
(ii) The rate of return on the invested capital of the for-
profit partner is limited (reasonable under the circum-
stances, perhaps subject to a reasonable cap); and
(iii) There is no obligation on the part of the exempt partner
to return the for-profit partner's capital from the ex-
empt partner's own funds.
65 Id.
66 The checklist is excerpted from MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES
INVOLVING TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 51-61 (2nd ed. Supp. 2004).
67 Janet E. Gitterman & Marvin Friedlander, HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
REFERENCE GUIDE (2003) in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004. The publica-
tion provides a long checklist of items the IRS will consider when processing applica-
tions from health care providers applying for recognition of exempt status under §
501(c)(3). The items on the checklist were taken from well-established precedents.
The article specifies that all applications from entities that will be entering into whole
hospital joint ventures will be reviewed using this checklist. Therefore, both the
publication checklist items and the items listed under the Joint Venture Checklist in
this Appendix may be used by such entities that are seeking exempt status and at the
same time, seeking to participate in joint ventures.
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3. Does the exempt partner have a right of first refusal on the
sale of the assets of the joint venture?
4. Has the tax-exempt partner obtained a written, reasoned
and comprehensive opinion from Counsel prior to proceed-
ing with the joint venture transaction?
5. Is the tax-exempt partner the Tax Matters Partner? It is
advisable that the exempt partner be the Tax Matters Part-
ner in the joint venture since this will allow it to control all
IRS audit and related issues.
6. Has the tax-exempt partner received an ownership interest
in the joint venture commensurate with the value of the as-
sets it contributed?
7. Do the joint venture participants receive distributions of
earnings in proportion to their capital contributions?
8. Has the exempt partner entered into a non-compete agree-
ment or restrictive covenant which would cause it to yield
significant market advantages and competitive benefits to
the for-profit partner?
9. Does the joint venture engage the services of independent
attorneys and accountants who do not also represent the
for-profit partner?
10. Were any financial or other inducements offered to the
executives of the nonprofit or members of the governing
board for approval of the affiliation?
11. Is the tax-exempt partner providing any guarantees? While
not all guarantees are problematic, the IRS views certain
guarantees, especially in the low-income housing area, that
have the effect of insulating the for-profit partner from po-
tential risk as problematic, since the guarantees increase
the potential risk to the nonprofit.
Board Involvement:
12. Does the tax-exempt partner have voting control of the
board of the joint venture so that it can exercise effective
control over policies, major actions and decisions that af-
fect its tax-exempt purposes?
13. What criteria are used by the joint venture to select its gov-
erning board?
14. What are the qualifications of the members of the govern-
ing board of the joint venture, and how much input did the
exempt organization have in the selection of these people?




15. Are the members of the board "representative of the com-
munity?"
17. Do the governing documents impose on the governing
board members a duty to promote the charitable purposes
of the nonprofit, which should take precedence over any
other fiduciary duty, such as maximizing profits?
18. Does the exempt board have the right to (i) amend or mod-
ify the joint venture's governing documents; (ii) approve
the venture's annual capital and operating budgets; (iii) ap-
prove distribution of income and additional capital contri-
butions; (iv) approve the venture's acquisition and disposi-
tion of health care facilities and equipment; (v) approve
large contracts and assumption of indebtedness by the ven-
ture; (vi) approve changes in the types of services offered
by the venture; (vii) select key executives of the venture
and of the health care facilities, hire and fire employees,
compel an audit and ensure adequate reserves?
19. Does the operating agreement of the joint venture include a
dispute resolution provision which would ensure that, in
the event that a disagreement arises between the board and
the members over the actions or policies of the joint ven-
ture, resolution would favor the exempt partner's charitable
purposes?
Health Care Ventures:
20. Do the governing documents of the joint venture require
that the services provided by the joint venture promote the
health of the community as a whole?
21. Does the joint venture undertake activities for the primary
purpose of promoting health rather than to confer private
benefits?
22. Does the operating agreement of the joint venture include a
provision requiring that the venture operate its facilities for
charitable purposes and in accordance with the community
benefits standard?
23. Does the exempt partner have the responsibility of adopt-
ing and setting medical and ethical standards for the joint
venture hospitals?
24. Does the exempt partner oversee the quality of health care
provided?
25. Does the exempt partner determine the prices for the deliv-
ery of health care, or control how the determination is
made?
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26. Does the joint venture have a substantial charity care pro-
gram which is consistent with the community benefit re-
quirements?
27. Does the joint venture have an accounting policy which
separates bad or uncollectible debts from charity care?
Day-To-Day Management:
28. Is there a management firm responsible for day to day ac-
tivities? If so, how is it selected? Is there a requirement
that the venture engage the services of a management firm
that is affiliated with the for-profit partner?
29. What are the terms of the management contract? Is it com-
parable to similar arrangements in the marketplace? Is the
management agreement one that is for a stated and reason-
able time period? (Not to exceed five years) May it be ex-
tended without the consent of the nonprofit? The IRS
views long term management contracts unfavorably.
30. Is the management agreement terminable by the exempt
partner if it determines that the management company is
not acting in furtherance of its exempt purpose?
31. Is the management company under a binding and enforce-
able obligation to further the charitable purposes of the
nonprofit?
32. Does the management company have the power to restrict
the authority of the exempt partner's board representatives
to initiate or react to decisions that would ensure that chari-
table goals are promoted?
33. Are the duties and responsibilities of the exempt partner
within the joint venture meaningful?
Management: Health Care:
34. How are executives selected, and who determines their
compensation and compensation for the service provider,
including the physicians?
35. What are the duties of the management firm? For instance,
does the management firm engage in any duties that may
conflict with the exempt partner's purpose to promote the
health of a broad section of the community?
36. Do any of the exempt partner's board member representa-
tives have a financial or other kind of dependency on the
hospital, the for-profit entity or the partnership, which
would create a conflict of interest with their duty to repre-
sent the interests of the community?
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Management agreements must also be carefully drafted to comply
with Revenue Ruling 98-15. The IRS clearly views an independent
management company (not affiliated with the for-profit partner) as a
positive factor, with terms in the management agreement that allow
the exempt organization a "way out." In other words, an agreement
that unilaterally permits a management company to renew the agree-
ment is unacceptable, as in Situation 2. The 2000 CPE joint venture
article comments that the management agreement in Example 2 is
"essentially a perpetual contract" because it was renewable at the sole
option of the management company which is run by former employ-
ees of the for-profit partner.68
Exempt organizations must be extremely careful about allowing
employees or former employees of for-profit partners to serve in key
positions in the partnership. The IRS appears to be primarily con-
cerned that such persons would limit or "package" information flow-
ing to exempt organization partners so that such partners would, as a
practical matter, be deprived of some of their control, due to the lim-
ited information flow. In the 2000 CPE Joint Venture Article, the IRS
explains that even though these officers' compensation is reasonable,
the fact that they were employed by the for-profit creates the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest.
69
Finally, the ruling indicates that other provisions in the partner-
ship agreement that, as a practical matter limit the exempt organiza-
tion's control, also will be carefully scrutinized. To illustrate, the IRS
implied that the provision in Example 2 allowing the management
company to enter all but unusually large contracts, combined with the
limited flow of information likely to result from employing former
employees of the for-profit entity, meant that the exempt organization
could not effectively establish that the activities of the venture would
further exempt purposes.
In sum, exempt organizations participating in joint ventures with
for-profit entities and/or private investors should carefully structure
provisions in the agreements to satisfy themselves that they are not
deprived of control over the operations of the partnership, or limited
in their ability to ensure that the venture will be operated for charita-
ble purposes.
68 Salins, 2000 CPE Article, supra note 46, at 17. The 2000 CPE article does
state, however, that Example 1 implies that a management agreement with a nonprofit
affiliate of the exempt hospital would be acceptable. Id.
69 Id. at 19.
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B. Redlands Surgical Services, Inc. v. Commissioner7°
1. Facts
In a significant case in the health care area, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court opinion upholding the denial
of IRC § 501(c)(3) status to Redlands Surgical Services, Inc. (Red-
lands). 71 Redlands, a California nonprofit public benefit corporation,
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Redlands Health Systems, Inc.
(RHS), a charitable organization under § 501(c)(3). RHS was the
parent corporation of three other subsidiaries, two of which were also
exempt under § 501(c)(3). One of the two exempt subsidiaries was
Redlands Community Hospital (Redlands Hospital), a hospital within
the meaning of § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii), which provided medical care free
of charge or at a discount, and which maintained its own surgery pro-
gram and emergency room.
In March 1990, RHS became a co-general partner with Redlands-
SCA Surgery Centers, Inc. (SCA Centers), a for-profit corporation, in
a general partnership formed to acquire a sixty-one percent interest in
an existing outpatient surgical center in Redlands, California. RHS
contributed cash and SCA Centers contributed cash and stock to the
general partnership. In return for its thirty-seven percent investment,
RHS received a forty-six percent interest in profits, losses, and cash-
flow of the general partnership.
The general partnership agreement provided that the management
and determination of all questions relating to the affairs and policies
of the partnership were to be decided by a majority vote of the manag-
ing directors. The managing directors consisted of four persons - two
of whom were appointed by RHS and two of whom were appointed
by SCA Centers. In the event the managing directors were unable to
agree, either RHS or SCA Centers could submit the matter to arbitra-
tion. The decision of a majority of the arbitrators was to be final and
binding.
The general partnership became the sole general partner in Inland
Surgery Center Limited Partnership (the Operating Partnership), a
California limited partnership that owned and operated a freestanding
ambulatory surgery center (the Surgery Center) within two blocks of
Redlands Hospital. Prior to the Operating Partnership's affiliation
with the general partnership, the Operating Partnership had been a for-
70 This discussion is updated and excerpted from SANDERS, supra note 8, at
344-49.
71 Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47, 92 (1999), aff'd,
242 F.3d 904, 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
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profit venture which served only surgical patients who could pay for
its services. The partnership agreement of the Operating Partnership
did not contain a statement of charitable purpose or a requirement that
it operate for a charitable purpose before its affiliation with RHS and
it was not amended to include such a provision after its affiliation with
RHS. The Surgery Center offered no free care to indigents and it had
no emergency room or certification to treat the emergency patient
population.
The Operating Partnership entered into a contract with SCA Man-
agement Co. (SCA Management), a for-profit subsidiary of SCA,
whereby SCA Management would provide management and adminis-
trative services for the Surgery Center. With the exception of deci-
sions relating to the care and treatment of patients or other medical
policy matters, SCA Management had wide-ranging authority for the
management of the Surgery Center.
In return for its services, SCA Management was to receive a
monthly management fee of six percent of gross revenue from the
operation of the Surgery Center. The management agreement had a
term of fifteen years, renewable unilaterally by SCA Management for
two five-year extensions. With the exception of bankruptcy or insol-
vency, the management contract was terminable by the Operating
Partnership only if SCA Management breached the agreement, and
then only after a ninety-day notice and a ninety-day cure period.
In April 1990, SCA Management entered into a quality assurance
agreement with RHS whereby RHS agreed to perform managerial and
supervisory quality assurance duties in connection with the operation
of the Surgery Center. RHS was to receive a monthly fee after the
first year, and it was to be reimbursed for its direct out-of-pocket ex-
penses.
Five months after entering into the general partnership agreement
with SCA Centers, RHS incorporated RSS as a California nonprofit
public benefit corporation, and transferred its interest in the General
Partnership to RSS. RHS also transferred its obligations and rights
under the quality assurance agreement to RSS. RSS's sole activity
(and its sole source of revenue) was to be its participation in the Oper-
ating Partnership.
The IRS argued that RSS was not operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes because it operated for the benefit of private parties
and failed to benefit a broad cross-section of the community. In sup-
port of its position, the IRS stated that the partnership agreements and
related management contract were structured to give for-profit parties
control over the Surgery Center. Moreover, the Surgery Center had
never operated with a charitable purpose.
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RSS, on the other hand, argued that it met the operational test of §
501(c)(3) because its activities with respect to the Surgery Center fur-
ther its purpose of promoting health for the benefit of the RSS com-
munity, by providing access to an ambulatory surgery center for all
members of the community based upon medical need rather than abil-
ity to pay, and by integrating the outpatient services of Redlands Hos-
pital and the Surgery Center. RSS further argued that it engaged in
arm's length transactions with the for-profit partners, and that its in-
fluence over the activities of the Surgery Center has been sufficient to
further its charitable goals. RSS also argued that it performed services
that were "integral" to the exempt purposes of RHS, its tax-exempt
parent, and Redlands Hospital.
2. The Redlands Court Decisions
By applying a facts and circumstances analysis, the Tax Court up-
held the IRS's denial of RSS's tax-exempt status. The court con-
cluded that RSS had effectively ceded control over the operations of
the partnerships and the Surgery Center to private parties, thus confer-
ring impermissible private benefit upon them. In this regard, the court
noted that the promotion of health for the benefit of the community is
a charitable purpose. However, the community benefit standard also
requires that the charity serve a sufficiently large and indefinite class
and that private interests not benefit to any substantial degree. Red-
lands appealed the Tax Court decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Just ten days after appellate oral arguments, the Ninth Circuit is-
sued a per curiam opinion.72 The single paragraph "adopted" the Tax
Court holding that Redlands had "ceded effective control over the
operations of the partnerships and the surgery center to private parties,
conferring impermissible private benefit." Because private parties
were obtaining substantial benefit, the surgery center was not being
operated exclusively for exempt purposes. The Ninth Circuit also af-
firmed the Tax Court view that private benefit prevented Redlands
from claiming exempt status under the integral part doctrine.
The Court of Appeals had little choice but to affirm the decisions
of the Tax Court and the IRS. The Redlands venture incorporated
none of the positive factors and many of the negative factors that the
Service has discussed in Revenue Ruling 98-15 and elsewhere:




" No charitable purpose in partnership documents (in fact,
profit motive protected by partnership documents);
* Charity does not have control of the Board (equal repre-
sentation on board);
* No charitable override for deadlocked board or arbitra-
tion decisions;
" Management company is a subsidiary of the for-profit
partner;
* Long management contract (fifteen years) renewable in
sole discretion of management company;
" Surgery center did not perform any free medical care
even after it formed the venture;
* An agreement restricted the ability of charitable hospital
to expand its own ambulatory surgery center; and
* Rate of return on the venture was in excess of forty-three
percent.
Based on the totality of these factors, the Tax Court and the Ap-
pellate Court concluded that RSS impermissibly served private inter-
ests. Although the courts did not specifically refer to Revenue Ruling
98-15, Redlands buttresses the IRS's authority to enforce Revenue
Ruling 98-15 with respect to whole hospital joint ventures and other
types of joint ventures involving exempt organizations. Again, the
analysis will be based on the totality of all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to, the exempt organization's formal and informal con-
trol of the day-to-day activities of the venture, as well as a binding
commitment of the parties in the operative documents that charitable
purposes, as opposed to for-profit purposes, must prevail. Factors that
will mitigate against charitability are long term management agree-
ments with a for-profit entity which has the unilateral right to renew
the contract, arbitration provisions that do not take into account chari-
tability, and the lack of any evidence of actual charitable operations.
C. St. David's Health Care System
In St. David's Health Care System v. United States, the jury in a
United States district court found in favor of the nonprofit, 73 having
applied the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, which expands the control test of
Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands. In 1996, St. David's contrib-
uted all of its health care facilities to a joint venture with a for-profit
73 St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, No. AO1CV046JN, 2004
U.S. Dist. WL 555095 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2004).
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health system, Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation (HCA).74
HCA contributed a small portion of its property to the partnership, and
the partnership hired a subsidiary of HCA to manage the day-to-day
activities of the partnership's medical facilities.75 All parties agreed
that the St. David's joint venture performed substantial charity care
and that its activities met the community benefit standard. 76 The dis-
agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS was whether St. David's
retained enough control over the venture to ensure that the charity
care would continue into the future, without substantial private bene-
fits flowing to HCA.77
After the IRS revoked its exempt status, St. David's paid the fed-
eral taxes allegedly owed for one year and proceeded to district court
in Texas under a claim for refund.78 The Texas district judge ruled in
favor of St. David's on a summary judgment motion: however, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there were genuine issues of
material fact, and so reversed the District Court and remanded the
case for a jury trial. 79 The Fifth Circuit, in its lengthy opinion, relied
upon Revenue Ruling 98-15 but expanded the legal analysis and held
that the tax-exempt organization does not have to retain formal control
of the partnership if it has effective control over the major decisions of
the partnership. 80 The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the non-
profit should retain effective control to enable it to dissolve the part-
nership, if warranted. 81 On remand the district court, following the
Fifth Circuit, instructed the jury to consider the totality of the circum-
stances in deciding whether the partnership's operations primarily
furthered charitable purposes, including the partnership's benefit to
the community.8 2 The circumstances highlighted by the District Court
in the jury instructions included the following:
74 St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 233 (5th Cir.
2003).
71 Id. at 234.
76 Jury Instructions at 9, St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, No.
A-01-CA-46JN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining that
when deciding the charitable purposes issue, the community benefit standard may be
considered).
77 St. David's Health Care Sys., 346 F.3d at 232.
78 Id. at 234.
71 Id. at 244.
80 Id. at 238.
81 Id. at 241, 244. Although St. David's argued that its power to dissolve the
partnership provided it with a significant amount of control over partnership opera-
tions, the court reasoned that it was unlikely that St. David's would exercise its option
to dissolve the partnership.
82 St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, No. AOCV046JN, 2004
U.S. Dist. WL 555095 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2004).
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[t]o "give up control" of the Partnership ... means to give up
the direct or indirect ability to determine the direction of man-
agement and policies through ownership, contract or other-
wise. In determining whether St. David's retained sufficient
effective control, you should consider all the facts and cir-
cumstances, including, but not limited to, (i) any applicable
powers or rights allocated to St. David's in the Partnership's
governing documents, (ii) evidence of St. David's ability and
willingness, if any, to enforce any such powers, (iii) the struc-
ture of the Partnership, (iv) the management of the Partner-
ship, and (v) the actual operation and subsequent activities of
the Partnership. 3
The court also instructed the jury that even if the community benefit
test was met and St. David's and the partnership provided an exten-
sive amount of charity care, "[y]ou must also find that the Partner-
ship's activities do not substantially further the private benefit of
HCA.' ' 4 The jury was also instructed that:
[i]n considering whether Partnership operations primarily fur-
ther charitable purposes, you must determine whether St.
David's, when it entered the Partnership, retained sufficient
control over Partnership operations to ensure that Partnership
operations primarily further charitable purposes, and that no
more than an insubstantial amount of the Partnership's activi-
ties further non-exempt interests. If St. David's gave up for-
mal or effective control, it is presumed that the Partnership
operations further the profit-seeking motivations of HCA and
that St. David's activities via the Partnership are not primarily
in furtherance of its charitable purposes. 85
The jury ultimately found in favor of St. David's, and the govern-
ment's appeal of the jury verdict was settled out of court by the par-
86ties.
The jury instructions, derived from the Fifth Circuit opinion, ex-
tend the two-prong charitable purpose and control test that is most
clearly applicable to whole hospital joint ventures. The test that was
utilized in St. David's encompasses a community benefit standard,
83 Jury Instructions at 15, St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States,
No. A-01-CA-46JN, 2002 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 20265 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
84 Id. at 10.
85 Id. at 13.
86 St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, No. AO1CV046JN, 2004
U.S. Dist. WL 555095 at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2004).
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unique to the health care area, as an important part of the first prong
charitable purpose test. The St. David's test also utilizes a broader
facts and circumstances determination as to whether the exempt part-
ner has retained effective control over the activities carried on by the
joint venture.
IV. REVENUE RULING 2004-51
Soon after the jury decided St. David's, the IRS issued Revenue
Ruling 2004-51, 2004-22 IRB 974 .87 This ruling analyzes a non-
health-care ancillary joint venture and is the first published guidance
of its kind, involving an ancillary venture between a non-health care
charitable organization and a for-profit entity, where each party main-
tains a fifty percent share in the venture. The ruling demonstrates that
"control" of the entire venture is not essential; control can be "bifur-
cated," as long as the exempt organization controls the substantive,
"charitable" aspects. Moreover, given the exempt organization's ex-
clusive control over the venture's charitable aspects, the need for an
affirmative charitable "override" is no longer required.
In the revenue ruling, a § 501(c)(3) university expanded the scope
of its educational programs by forming a limited liability company
(LLC) with a for-profit entity specializing in interactive video train-
ing. The activities of this joint venture between the exempt university
and the for-profit corporation were an insubstantial part of the univer-
sity's overall activities.
The Articles of Organization and the Operating Agreement
(Agreement) provided that the LLC's sole purpose was to offer
teacher training programs to satellite locations using interactive video
technology. The university and the for-profit each owned a fifty per-
cent share in the company, and had equal representation on the Board
of Directors. All allocations, returns of capital and distributions were
to be made commensurate with the nonprofit and for-profit members'
respective ownership interests.
The LLC was responsible for arranging and conducting all admin-
istrative details regarding the video training seminars for teachers.
The video seminars covered the same substantive material as the uni-
versity's seminars conducted on campus. Additionally, the Agree-
ment gave the university the exclusive right to determine and approve
the curricula, training materials, instructors, and standards of comple-
tion for the seminar. It gave the for-profit, on the other hand, the ex-
clusive right to select video training technicians and locations. All
17 Rev. Rul 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974 (the following portions of the text
analyze the facts by which Revenue Ruling 2004-51 was issued).
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other decisions were to be made by mutual consent of both the for-
profit and the university. Furthermore, in accordance with the
Agreement, all transactions entered into by the LLC were presumed to
be conducted at arm's length, with all prices presumed to be at fair
market value. The Agreement restricted the LLC's activities to the
administrative tasks connected with the teacher training seminars, and
mandated that the LLC not engage in any activities that would jeop-
ardize the university's 501 (c)(3) exempt status.
The Service analyzed two issues: 1) whether the university would
lose its exempt status due to its participation in this ancillary joint
venture; and 2) whether the university would recognize unrelated
business taxable income on its distributive share of the net profits.
A. Issue 1: Exemption Under § 501 (c)(3)
Whether, under the facts described above, an organization con-
tinues to qualify for exemption from federal income tax as an organi-
zation described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code when it
contributes a portion of its assets to and conducts a portion of its ac-
tivities through a limited liability company (LLC) formed with a for-
profit corporation.
The Internal Revenue Service, in the revenue ruling, makes three
important assumptions: 1) the joint venture activity is an "insubstan-
tial" part of the university's total activities; 2) all transactions are con-
ducted at "arm's length"; and 3) all contract and transaction prices are
at "fair market value." 88 Given these three fundamental assumptions,
it is difficult to envision a scenario in which any activity would en-
danger an organization's exempt status. Indeed, the revenue ruling
provides little analysis regarding this issue, and merely states that
based upon all the facts and circumstances, the university's participa-
tion in the joint venture, taken alone, will not affect the university's
continued qualification for exemption as an organization described in
§ 501(c)(3).
However, the inquiry does not stop there, because prior to reach-
ing its conclusion about exempt status, the IRS sets forth what it
views as the relevant legal standards: applicable provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulation, and Revenue Ruling 98-
15, Redlands and St. David's. It is the Service's reliance upon Reve-
nue Ruling 98-15, Redlands and St. David's, in particular, that gives
rise to the significance of this otherwise "plain vanilla" ruling. Im-
plicitly, the ruling suggests, but does not state, that given a different
set of facts, the cited legal standards would govern the analysis.
8 Id. at 976.
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In its reliance upon the legal precedent governing joint ventures,
the IRS reiterates the two prong test of Revenue Ruling 98-15, that: 1)
participation in the joint venture must further a charitable purpose,
and 2) the partnership arrangement must permit the exempt organiza-
tion to act exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose and only
incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit partners. Redlands is cited
for the holding that an exempt organization may form a partnership,
so long as it does not thereby impermissibly serve private interests.
Ceding "effective control" of partnership activities is highlighted as a
factor that impermissibly serves private interests. Finally, St. David's
is cited for the proposition that it is not enough to conclude that the
joint venture actually serves charitable interests. Rather, the nonprofit
partner must have the "capacity to ensure" that the partnership's op-
erations further charitable purposes, again reemphasizing that if the
nonprofit cedes control to the for-profit entity, the non-profit should
lose its tax-exempt status.
While none of these principles came into play given the favorable
facts and circumstances of Revenue Ruling 2004-51, they imply that
the analysis in ancillary joint ventures will follow the principles set
down in Revenue Ruling 98-15, Redlands and St. David's, that control
over the joint venture, or at a minimum, "bifurcated" control over the
charitable aspects of the venture, is necessary to avoid unrelated busi-
ness income as well as loss of exemption, at least in the context of a
"substantial" activity.
Accordingly, this ruling suggests the application of a new test, re-
ferred to herein as the "UBIT plus Control" test which includes a
Revenue Ruling 98-15 "control" analysis as an added component to
the standard UBIT analysis, converting an otherwise "related" activity
to an "unrelated" activity, if the exempt organization cedes control
over the substantive aspects of the venture. The "conversion" occurs
because the lack of control presumes unwarranted private benefit.89
B. Issue 2: Unrelated Business Income
Whether, under the same facts, the organization is subject to un-
related business income tax under § 511 on its distributive share of
the LLC's income.
89 See Bruce R. Hopkins, Nonprofit Counsel: IRS Issues Ancillary Joint
Venture Guidance, LAW TAX-EXEMPT ORG. MoNTHLY, July 2004, at 3. Mr. Hopkins,
in discussing Revenue Ruling 2004-51, stated: "The IRS is implicitly saying that the
business in the joint venture is thereby converted to an unrelated business, even
though the business remains inherently related. Presumably, this transformation
occurs by application of the private benefit doctrine - a novel theory." Id.
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The second issue raised by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 2004-51,
should require a standard unrelated business income tax analysis un-
der § § 511, 512, and 513 of the Internal Revenue Code. Again, how-
ever, the IRS has set forth a factual scenario that should lead to an
obvious conclusion that the educational activities of the joint venture
are substantially related to the university's exempt purpose, which
renders the unrelated business analysis superfluous, at best.
As stated, in this factual scenario, the university has an educa-
tional exempt purpose, clearly defined by the Treasury regulations.
The ancillary joint venture furthered the pursuit of that purpose by
broadening the outreach of the educational activities of the university.
Significantly, as to the educational functions of the LLC, the exempt
organization had exclusive control. Moreover, the manner in which
the for-profit conducted the administrative functions did not affect the
educational nature of the venture. Thus, based upon all of the facts
and circumstances, the IRS concluded that the activities of the joint
venture were related to the clearly defined educational exempt pur-
pose of the university, and so the university did not have any unre-
lated business tax liability attributable to its participation in the joint
venture.
As mentioned previously, an interesting question in the analysis in
Revenue Ruling 2004-51, is whether the IRS is now applying a
"UBIT plus Control" test, which applies the standard UBIT analysis
to ancillary joint ventures involving exempt organization, and super-
imposes upon that standard the "control test" of Revenue Ruling 98-
15, Redlands and St. David's; so that even if the activity of the part-
nership is "substantially related" to the exempt organization's pur-
pose, it will be deemed to be an "unrelated" trade or business if the
exempt organization cedes effective control over the substantive as-
pects of the venture to the for-profit entity.
Stated another way, what this ruling implies is that, given other
factual patterns or scenarios not presented in the ruling, even a sub-
stantially related activity may cause loss of exemption, or generate
UBIT to the nonprofit, if the nonprofit cedes control to the for-profit,
at least as to the "charitable" or substantive aspects of the venture. In
order to illustrate this new standard, we have set forth below eight
different "scenarios" or fact patterns, with various combinations of
factors, to illustrate the possible implications of Revenue Ruling
2004-51.
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" Exempt organization does not cede control over joint
venture activities to for-profit; and
" The joint venture is an insubstantial part of the exempt
organization's total activities.
This is the "plain vanilla" scenario described in Revenue Ruling
2004-51, in which the exempt organization's status is not jeopardized
by its participation in the joint venture, since it retains control over
the charitable aspects of the venture and the venture is an insubstan-
tial part of the nonprofit's total activities. As in the ruling, the uni-
versity is not subject to unrelated business income tax liability for the
activities of the joint venture.
2. Scenario 2:
* Exempt organization does not cede control over joint
venture activities to for-profit; and
* The joint venture is a substantial (but less than fifty per-
cent) part of the exempt organization's total activities.
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Again, this scenario is similar to the fact pattern in Revenue Rul-
ing 2004-51 in that the activity is "related" to the exempt organiza-
tion's charitable purpose, and the exempt organization retains control
over the joint venture's educational activities. Thus, even though the
activities are a substantial part of the exempt organization's total ac-
tivities, the organization's exempt status is not jeopardized, and there
is no unrelated business income tax liability, pursuant to the analysis
contained in Revenue Ruling 2004-51; Revenue Ruling 98-15; Red-
lands and St. David's.
3. Scenario 3:
" Exempt organization cedes control over joint venture ac-
tivities to for-profit; and
* Joint venture activities are an insubstantial part of ex-
empt organization's total activities.
Under this scenario, the university (using the fact pattern of Reve-
nue Ruling 2004-51) would cede control over the educational aspects
of the venture, to the for-profit. Since the joint venture is an insub-
stantial part of the university's total activities, the exempt status of the
university would presumably not be affected. Similarly, since the
activities of the joint venture are "related" to the university's educa-
tional purposes, under a traditional UBIT analysis, there should be no
unrelated business income tax liability. However, given the new
"UBIT plus Control" test, which looks to Revenue Ruling 98-15, Red-
lands and St. David's, certain unanswered questions remain. For ex-
ample:
* Since the activity is "related," is it relevant that the non-
profit cedes control over the joint venture activities?
* Does the fact that the for-profit partner controls the ven-
ture's activities convert clearly "related" activities to un-
related activities, similar to the analysis in Revenue Rul-
ing 98-15?
* Is the inquiry no longer a straightforward UBIT analysis
for an ancillary joint venture, but rather a determination
as to whether the joint venture's activities will always fur-
ther the nonprofit's exempt purpose and never result in
private benefit?
* Is control over the joint venture activities a relevant in-
quiry for purposes of a UBIT analysis?
Those questions remain unanswered, since Revenue Ruling 2004-
51 does not provide clarity on these issues. However, applying the
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analysis of the "bad" example in Revenue Ruling 98-15 results in the
conclusion that "control" over the activities of an ancillary joint ven-
ture is an important, if not essential, factor and conversely, a for-
profit's control over the venture could convert an otherwise "related"
activity into an "unrelated" activity. In this factual scenario, since the
activities of the venture are "insubstantial" in view of the exempt or-
ganization's overall activities, the exempt status of the organization
should not be jeopardized. However, the exempt partner may be li-
able for an unrelated business income tax on the income from the ven-
ture.
4. Scenario 4:
* Exempt organization cedes control over joint venture ac-
tivities to for-profit; and
" The joint venture is a substantial (but less than fifty per-
cent) part of the exempt organization's total activities.
This scenario raises similar questions to those raised in Scenario 3
above, and is very close to the "bad" example in Revenue Ruling 98-
15. The IRS concluded in Revenue Ruling 98-15 that since the non-
profit ceded control over the health care activities to the for-profit
partner, the joint venture was not required to serve charitable purposes
and the private benefit to the for-profit partner would therefore not be
incidental. Thus, the exempt status of the nonprofit partner was de-
nied. Essentially, in that ruling the "related" activity of the provision
of health care was converted into an "unrelated" activity, due to the
nonprofit's lack of control over the venture and its inability to initiate
programs to meet the community benefit standard without the support
of the for-profit partner. Again, in that ruling the presence of substan-
tial private benefit to the for-profit partners was assumed.
Presumably, the analysis for an ancillary joint venture with these
three criteria would follow the "whole hospital" joint venture in
Revenue Ruling 98-15 since a substantial part of the exempt organiza-
tion's total activities will be encompassed by the joint venture, even








" Joint venture is an unrelated trade or business, and the
exempt organization cedes control over the joint ven-
ture's activities to for-profit; and
* The joint venture is an insubstantial part of the exempt
organization's total activities.
An example of this scenario would be if the university as de-
scribed in Revenue Ruling 2004-51, were to enter into a joint venture
with AMC Widgets, Inc., to manufacture widgets for sale to the pub-
lic. Clearly an "unrelated" activity, yet an unsubstantial part of the
university's overall activities.
It would seem at first blush that Revenue Ruling 2004-51 should
have no impact on this scenario: § 513(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that an exempt organization's share of partnership in-
come from an unrelated trade or business carried on by a partnership
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of which it is a member must be included in calculating the organiza-
tion's unrelated business taxable income.
90
However, under the "UBIT plus Control" test, since the for-profit
has control over the joint venture activities in this scenario there may
be a presumption of unwarranted private benefit under the analysis in
Revenue Ruling 98-15. In that case, there could, but would not likely,
be jeopardy to the exempt organization's charitable status.
2. Scenario 6:
* Joint venture is an unrelated trade or business, and the
exempt organization cedes control over the joint ven-
ture's unrelated activities to for-profit; and
* The joint venture is a substantial (but less than fifty per-
cent) part of the exempt organization's total activities
This factual scenario is closest to Redlands where the for-profit
partner had control over the activities of the joint venture (in that case,
the outpatient surgical center), and thus, the health care activities of
the surgical center were deemed to be "unrelated" to the nonprofit's
exempt purpose. In Redlands, the court held that the nonprofit partner
did not qualify as a tax-exempt entity, since the unrelated joint venture
activities were its sole activities.
91
Accordingly, in this scenario, there is a question as to whether
substantial unrelated activities will result in a denial or revocation of
exemption. Under a standard UBIT analysis the answer would be
determined by analyzing all of the facts and circumstances. However,
assuming a "UBIT plus Control" test, the analysis looks to the fact
that the for-profit entity controls the joint venture, and thus, private
benefit is assumed. Under that type of analysis, the exempt organiza-
tion's status would likely be in jeopardy. Given the fact that Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 has cast doubt upon the well established analysis util-
ized in unrelated business inquiries when the unrelated business is
conducted through an ancillary joint venture, the better option in this
case may be to spin the unrelated business activity off into a wholly
owned for-profit corporate subsidiary.
90 I.R.C. § 513(c) (2000) (explaining that activities carried out for profitable
purposes shall not be excluded from taxes even if such activity does not actually
generate profits).




* Joint venture is an unrelated trade or business, and the
exempt organization does not cede control over joint
venture's activities to for-profit; and
* The joint venture is an insubstantial part of the exempt
organization's total activities
This scenario would require a standard unrelated business taxable
income analysis in which control is irrelevant. The activity is insub-
stantial, and the exempt organization would be liable for the unrelated
business income tax, but its exempt status would not be jeopardized.
Because the activity is controlled by the exempt organization, private
benefits flowing to the for-profit partners would not be assumed, pur-
suant to the reasoning in Revenue Ruling 2004-51.
4. Scenario 8:
* Joint venture is an unrelated trade or business, and the
exempt organization does not cede control over joint
venture's activities to for-profit; and
* The joint venture is a substantial (but less than fifty per-
cent) of exempt organization's total activities.
Although the exempt organization does not cede control, the ac-
tivity is unrelated and substantial, and even under the conventional
unrelated business income tax analysis, this activity could impact the
exempt status of the nonprofit organization. The issue of control over
the unrelated activity should be irrelevant. However, since the non-
profit retained control there presumably would not be any presump-
tion of private benefit. In any event, the nonprofit would be subject to
the unrelated business income tax under §§ 511-513.
E. General Legal Analysis of Revenue Ruling 2004-51
As discussed above, the importance of Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is
not in what it says, but in what it implies and leaves unsaid. As sug-
gested, the addition of the "UBIT plus Control" test to what would
otherwise be a straightforward unrelated business income tax analysis
raises many questions. The practitioner should be aware of this impli-
cation and recognize that the IRS may require that a "UBIT plus Con-
trol" test be applied to determine whether an organization's exempt
status will be impacted by an ancillary joint venture's activities in
which the substantive aspect of the venture is controlled by the for-
profit entity, whether or not the venture constitutes a "related" activ-
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ity. Under the theory of Revenue Ruling 98-15, when the for-profit
partner controls the activity, a "related" activity may be analyzed as
"unrelated" and private benefit may be assumed. 92 Moreover, the
entity's exempt status may be jeopardized if the activity is substantial.
As indicated, the variable that is absent in the eight scenarios dis-
cussed above is the specific presence or absence of private benefit to
the for-profit partners. In Revenue Ruling 2004-51, it is stated that
there is no private benefit, although there are of course, certain bene-
fits flowing from the joint venture partnership to the for-profit part-
ner.93 It can be argued that when the nonprofit partner controls the
joint venture, it is safe to assume there will be no unwarranted private
benefit to the for-profit partners, other than the proportional benefits
of the partnership interests. If impermissible private benefit develops
within a joint venture structure in which the nonprofit maintains con-
trol, this premise assumes that the nonprofit will exercise its control to
protect its charitable assets. On the other hand, if the nonprofit cedes
its control to the for-profit, it appears that the IRS will likely assume
the presence of impermissible private benefit.
F. Structural Guidance
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 provides certain lessons to the tax-
exempt practitioner. Significantly, the governing documents between
the university and the for-profit entity incorporate certain safeguards
to prevent the venture from serving private interests. Any exempt
entity contemplating such a venture should ensure that its venture
documents contain similar provisions. First, the governing documents
should require that the terms of all contracts and transactions entered
into by the joint venture, both with its ventures and with any other
parties, be at arm's length and for fair market value, based on compa-
rables. Second, the governing documents should restrict activities in
which the joint venture may participate, to activities that further the
exempt purposes of the nonprofit partner. Third, the governing
documents should contain a general prohibition against engaging in
any activity which might jeopardize the exempt organization's status.
Finally, the facts should demonstrate that the joint venture did, in fact,
operate in accordance with the terms of the governing documents.
Furthermore, and most important in forming a joint venture or
partnership, the governing documents should ensure that the exempt
organization has full control over the substantive exempt function
activities of the joint venture. For example, in Revenue Ruling 2004-
92 See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 9.
93 Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974.
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51, the university had control over the educational content, including
sole approval of course curricula, training materials, and instructors,
even though the for-profit partner had control over certain administra-
tive matters. 94 This bifurcation of the functions of the joint venture is
a significant concession on the part of the IRS, that "control" of the
entire venture is not essential, as long as the exempt organization con-
trols the substantive "charitable" aspects of the venture.
Finally, in order to avoid unrelated business income, it is neces-
sary for the joint venture to participate in an activity that is "substan-
tially related" to its exempt purpose. In Revenue Ruling 2004-51, the
determination that the activities were related was straightforward,
given the regulatory definition of "educational purposes."95 There-
fore, it may be easier to demonstrate "substantially related" in the
education and low-income housing96 context, where there is a clear
definition of charitable purpose, and particularly in the low-income
housing tax credit context, there is a significant level of governmental
oversight and review, than it would be to demonstrate activities that
are substantially related to the provision of health care and other
charitable activities, where there are no clear statutory or regulatory
definitions.
V. SUMMARY
Health care exempt organizations have many options regarding
their structure and affiliations with for-profit entities. As long as any
joint ventures are carefully structured and the nonprofit retains control
over the exempt health care activities, the Internal Revenue Service
should not question the structure. However, as outlined above, if the
for-profit entity effectively gains control over the activities of the ven-
ture, the structure is not likely to be upheld by the IRS or the courts,
and either the exempt status of the nonprofit will be denied or re-
voked, or health care income will be subject to the unrelated business
income tax.
In summary, the health care industry has been severely impacted
by many economic forces, including uncertainty in the area of joint
94 Id.
95 Fred Stokeld, J. Christine Harris & Joseph J. Thomdike, EO Reps Focus
on Ancillary Joint Ventures, Shelters, 103 TAx NOTES 824, 824 (2004) (IRS Assistant
Chief Counsel, Catherine E. Livingston, stated in a recent meeting with the ABA tax
section that the regulations containing a definition of educational purposes "was an
important underpinning to our ability to do the guidance.").
96 See Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 CB 717 (which sets forth safe harbor guide-
lines that if satisfied, demonstrate that the organization meets the § 501(c)(3) stan-
dards of"charitability.").
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ventures between nonprofits and for-profit health care systems. The
uncertainty as to whether the joint venture would negatively impact
the nonprofit's tax-exempt status undoubtedly caused many nonprofits
to form for-profit subsidiaries and otherwise expanded operations in a
for-profit marketplace. Fortunately, with the guidance that is cur-
rently available in the form of Revenue Ruling 98-15, Redlands, St.
David's, and now Revenue Ruling 2004-51, health care institutions
can move forward with properly structured joint ventures with greater
confidence that the joint venture will not endanger the tax-exempt
status of the nonprofit.

